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Introduction
It is often argued that faith-based organizations (FBOs) provide a substantial
share of education, health, and other social services in African countries,
that they do so at a lower cost than the public sector, that the services pro-
vided by FBOs are of better quality than those of the public sector, and
finally that these services tend to be better targeted toward the poor than
is the case for the public sector (and certainly for the private sector). If all
of those assertions are correct, they have clear implications for policy, as
donors as well as governments should then be more inclined than is cur-
rently the case to support FBOs in their service delivery activities. 
As discussed in part 2 of this book, there is some evidence that faith-
based and more generally private schools achieve a better outcome for
their students than public schools and contribute to a more competitive
marketplace for education services (e.g., Altonji et al. 2005; Cox and
Jimenez 1990; Evans and Schwab 1995; González and Arévalo 2005;
Hsieh and Urquiola 2006; and Hoxby 1994). 
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Yet in this book, the evidence provided on faith-based schools is mixed.
Allcott and Ortega (2009) suggest that in R. B. de Venezuela, Fe y Alegría
schools perform slightly better on standardized test scores than public
schools, but the difference between the two sets of schools is limited, and
although Fe y Alegría schools are in principle targeting poor neighbor-
hoods, the data suggest few differences in the characteristics of the stu-
dents served by both sets of schools. In Bangladesh, Asadullah et al. (2009)
suggest that there are few differences in test scores between religious
(madrasas) and secular schools when selection into religious school is
taken into account, but they document a statistically significant learning
deficit for graduates of primary madrasas, who tend to have lower test
scores in secondary schools even after controlling for school- and classroom-
specific unobservable correlates of learning. Wodon and Ying (2009) show
that in Sierra Leone, faith-based schools do reach the poor much better
than public schools, and that after appropriate controls to take into
account the characteristics of students and endogenous school choice,
faith-based schools also perform marginally better than public schools in
promoting literacy and numeracy among students. By contrast Backiny-
Yetna and Wodon (2009) suggest that in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, there are no systematic differences between faith-based and pub-
lic schools in serving poor as opposed to nonpoor students, with also small
differences in quality that tend not to be statistically significant. 
Apart from the issue of the comparative performance of students from
different schools, there has also been some work in the literature on the
cost of services for their users, and how this cost, or the level of the serv-
ice provided, varies between faith-based and public providers. In their
analysis of health service provision in Uganda, Reinikka and Svensson
(forthcoming) use a change in financing of not-for-profit health care
providers through untied grants to test two theories of organizational
behavior. The first theory postulates that not-for-profit providers are
intrinsically motivated to serve the poor and will therefore use new
resources to expand their services or cut the cost of these services. The
second theory postulates that not-for-profit providers are captured by
their managers or workers and behave like for-profit actors. Although
they may not appropriate profits, they would tend to use untied grants to
raise the salaries of their staff or provide them with other benefits that
would not directly serve the poor. The authors’ empirical results suggest
that the first altruistic theory is validated by the data, and that the results
matter in the sense that this altruistic difference makes a difference for
the poor.
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In this chapter, using recent household survey data for Cameroon, we
focus on measuring the cost for households of the education services that
their children receive and assessing how this cost varies according to the
type of service provider. Thus, although we provide basic statistics on the
performance of various types of schools, we focus our econometric analy-
sis on the estimation of the private cost of education. We do so because
contrary to what is observed in some other countries, the data suggest
that faith-based schools in Cameroon serve primarily better-off children,
with public schools serving the poor better (private schools are even more
tilted toward better-off students, but that is to be expected). Cameroon
is a country in which the state provides subsidies to faith-based schools,
but not to private schools. However, subsidies provided per student to
faith-based schools in Cameroon are typically smaller than the subsidies
provided to public schools. This means that faith-based schools have to
raise more funds than public schools to be sustainable, which makes them
more expensive for parents than public schools and results in a weaker
targeting performance in reaching the poor (for details on education in
Cameroon, see among others World Bank 2003, 2005). 
How much more expensive are faith-based schools in comparison with
public schools? To answer that question, basic statistics are not enough
because we need to use proper econometric techniques to control for the
endogeneity of school choice. What is meant by endogeneity is the fact
that the choice of school by parents depends itself on the cost of the
schools. Because faith-based schools are more expensive than public
schools, parents who can afford these schools are likely to be able and
willing to spend more on the education of their children, all other things
being equal. This will typically generate an upward bias in the estimation
of the cost of faith-based schools for parents if no controls for endogene-
ity are used in the econometric analysis. Our econometric methodology
enables us to avoid such bias and obtain more reasonable comparisons of
costs than would be obtained without such an approach. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide
basic statistics on the key variables of interest for the analysis, including
the market share of the various types of schools, the satisfaction rates of
parents with the schools, and the costs of attending the schools. The sub-
sequent section provides the results of our econometric analysis to assess
the cost differential between different schools after controlling for the
characteristics of the children and their households, as well as the
endogenous choice of the school attended by the children. A brief con-
clusion follows.
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Basic Statistics
We focus our analysis on primary schools. The data are from the nationally
representative ECAM 3 survey implemented by the Institut National de la
Statistique in 2007. Tables 11.1 and 11.2 provide data on the market
shares of various types of school providers by quintile of per capita con-
sumption (with the first quintile, “Q1,” representing the poorest 20 percent
of the population, and the top quintile, “Q5,” the richest 20 percent) and
by the religious affiliation of the children. Given that the proportion of
the population in poverty is at 39.9 percent according to official estimates
from the National Statistical Office, the first two quintiles can be consid-
ered as representing the poor. 
Faith-based providers account for 14 percent of all primary school
students in urban areas and 11 percent in rural areas (12 percent at
the national level). The market share of public government schools is
86 percent in rural areas (in which private schools are virtually nonex-
istent) and 57 percent in urban areas (in which private schools account
for 29 percent of all students). Thus, although faith-based schools in
Cameroon do not have as large a market share as faith-based networks
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Backiny-Yetna and Wodon 2009)
or Sierra Leone (Wodon and Ying 2009), their role as service providers
is far from negligible.
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Table 11.1  Distribution of Students in Primary School by Quintile of per Capita 
Consumption
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All
Urban
Public 8.4 14.8 26.1 28.6 22.2 100.0
Private 0.5 5.7 15.9 29.3 48.5 100.0
Religious 6.2 10.9 22.7 28.1 32.1 100.0
All 5.8 11.6 22.7 28.7 31.2 100.0
Rural
Public 34.3 28.9 20.9 12.1 3.7 100.0
Private 20.2 24.4 24.5 24.2 6.7 100.0
Religious 16.1 33.0 24.2 19.2 7.5 100.0
All 31.9 29.2 21.4 13.3 4.2 100.0
Cameroon
Public 28.1 25.6 22.1 16.1 8.1 100.0
Private 4.3 9.3 17.5 28.3 40.5 100.0
Religious 12.3 24.5 23.6 22.6 17.0 100.0
All 23.5 23.6 21.8 18.2 12.9 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations using ECAM 3 survey for 2007 (INS, Cameroon).
Faith-based schools tend to serve households that are better off com-
pared with government schools. This is visible especially when comparing
statistics for students from the bottom quintile in rural areas, because 16
percent of the students in faith-based schools belong to the poorest quin-
tile in rural areas, versus 34 percent for government schools (the differ-
ences for the other quintiles are much smaller). In urban areas, differences
are largest in the top quintiles, which account for 32 percent of all stu-
dents in faith-based schools, versus 22 percent for the public sector. As
expected, private schools are even more tilted toward children from the
top quintiles. 
Faith-based schools also tend to serve Catholic and other Christian
children proportionately more than other groups, but Muslim and other
children also attend those schools. Thus one can argue than in Cameroon
as in other countries in which faith-based schools benefit from public
funding, there is probably no discrimination by faith-based schools
against students on the basis of their religion because the schools aim to
cater to the needs of all students. 
Although we will focus in the rest of this chapter on the private cost
of schooling, it is still useful to provide basic statistics on the performance
of faith-based and government schools. Three main outcome indicators
can be obtained from the survey: (1) whether students can read and write
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Table 11.2  Distribution of Students by Religion of Their Parents 
Catholic Protestant
Other 
Christian Muslim Others All
Urban
Public 47.9 56.3 50.5 82.3 50.8 57.1
Private 36.9 26.9 34.2 7.2 41.6 28.7
Religious 15.2 16.7 15.3 10.5 7.6 14.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Rural
Public 80.5 87.8 81.2 90.8 94.4 86.1
Private 3.0 3.6 3.6 4.4 0.7 3.2
Religious 16.6 8.6 15.2 4.7 4.9 10.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Cameroon
Public 68.1 79.1 72.8 87.9 86.3 76.8
Private 15.8 10.0 11.9 5.4 8.3 11.4
Religious 16.1 10.9 15.2 6.8 5.4 11.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations using ECAM 3 survey for 2007 (INS, Cameroon).
in English or French (Cameroon is a bilingual country, and the education
system supports education in both English and French, with the majority
of the students enrolled in French schools); (2) whether students have
repeated a grade in the previous year; and (3) whether children are still
enrolled at age 15. Table 11.3 provides summary statistics on these three
performance indicators. Most parents declare that their children can read
or write in either English or French, but the performance of faith-based
schools seems to be lower than that of other schools in urban areas and
higher in rural areas. In regard to repetition rates, public schools have the
lowest at the national and urban levels, and in rural areas the repetition
rate seems higher among faith-based schools. Faith-based schools have the
highest drop-out rates in all areas, with more than 20 percent of students
dropping out in the rural areas.
Table 11.4 provides data on the private costs of schooling by educa-
tion provider. The data for Cameroon are especially rich in this respect,
as it is feasible to identify the cost of schooling for each child, as opposed
to only having data for the household as a whole. We focus on the expen-
ditures that are directly paid to the schools because that is what is
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Table 11.3  Student Performance by Type of School
% of students 
Who can read 
and write in French 
or English 
(grade 2 to 6)
Who have not 
repeated a grade 
in the previous 
year (grade 1 to 6)
Who are still 
enrolled in school 
at age 15 
(all grades)
Urban
Public                 92.5                       75.9               94.0
Private                 95.3                       84.4               94.5
Religious                 89.3                       78.3               89.3
All                 92.8                       78.7               93.7
Rural
Public                 79.1                       66.3               92.1
Private                 73.2                       74.5               86.2
Religious                 83.7                       76.2               78.8
All                 79.5                       67.6               90.9
Cameroon
Public                 82.5                       68.6               92.6
Private                 91.2                       82.5               92.7
Religious                 85.9                       77.1               82.8
All                 83.9                       71.2               91.9
Source: Authors’ calculations using ECAM 3 survey for 2007 implemented by the INS, Cameroon.
affected by the type of funding that the schools receive from the govern-
ment (as explained earlier, a key reason for the higher cost of faith-based
as opposed to public schools is the fact that, although faith-based schools
are subsidized, they do not benefit from subsidies as much as public
schools do). 
Table 11.4 shows that private schools are by far the most expensive,
but faith-based schools are significantly more expensive than public
schools in both urban and rural areas. Most of the differences in costs are
related to registration fees, and especially other fees. By contrast, fees for
parent associations and other costs are not too different between the var-
ious types of schools. The various fees paid to schools represent most of
the private cost of schooling for households (however, those data are
available only for the household as a whole and not by child); other
expenses include the cost of uniforms, transport, books and materials, and
the like. The proportion of the formal fees paid to schools to the total pri-
vate costs of schooling, which is at 43 percent for the sample as a whole,
is fairly stable across well-being quintiles.
Looking at the data in table 11.4, one could be led to believe that faith-
based schools are about four times more expensive than public schools in
urban areas and three times more expensive in rural areas. However, such
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Table 11.4  Annual Education Expenditure (fees and related) by Student 
and by Type of School (in Franc CFA)
Registration Fees
Parent 
association Other All
Urban
Public 1,372 939 2,816 708 5,864
Private 7,313 38,141 1,609 1,418 49,420
Religious 4,198 17,152 1,839 1,107 24,818
All 3,504 14,157 2,333 969 21,181
Rural
Public 496 286 2,402 447 3,674
Private 3,604 13,248 1,163 401 19,400
Religious 1,714 8,454 984 525 11,571
All 730 1,612 2,218 453 5,051
Cameroon
Public 707 443 2,502 510 4,199
Private 6,576 33,184 1,520 1,215 43,499
Religious 2,703 11,857 1,325 762 16,717
All 1,633 5,689 2,255 621 10,257
Source: Authors’ calculation using ECAM 3 survey for 2007 implemented by the INS, Cameroon.
simple cost comparisons between the two types of schools do not account
for the fact that there are potentially important differences in the types
of students that enroll in public and faith-based schools. As mentioned
earlier, students enrolled in government schools tend to be from poorer
backgrounds than students in faith-based schools. Parents of poorer stu-
dents are likely to spend less on schools for obvious reasons. The key ques-
tion is, whether by controlling for the characteristics of the students and
their households and taking into account endogeneity in the choice of
school attended by children (this depends on the cost of schools for par-
ents), are faith-based schools still more expensive than government
schools? To answer that question, we turn to an econometric analysis in
the next section.
Econometric Analysis
Our technique for assessing the correlates of cost is simple. We estimate
a linear regression model on the logarithm of the cost of schooling (tak-
ing into account only the various fees paid to schools as outlined in table
11.4). Because the choice of school for a child depends on cost, we instru-
ment the choice of the type of school the child goes to through probit
regressions, which include as regressors all the correlates of the cost
regression plus the leave-out share of the students in the child’s geo-
graphic area that are going to faith-based or private schools. The child’s
geographic area is identified through the primary sampling unit to which
the household belongs in the survey (typically each primary sampling
unit includes between 20 and 30 households). We compute the leave-out
participation rate in faith-based schools not taking into account whether
the child himself or herself goes (thus, for each child in the same primary
sampling unit, we compute a different leave-out participation rate).1
The results for the determinants of the type of school attended are
not shown but are available on request. The leave-out market shares of
different types of schools at the PSU level are key determinants of the
type of school the child attends. In addition, students in the Anglophone
system are more likely to go to private schools, whereas students in rural
areas are less likely to do so. Very young and older children are more
likely to go to public schools than to private and faith-based schools.
Catholics are more likely to enroll in religious schools, whereas all other
groups are less likely to do so. There are strong geographic effects, with
the probability of going to private schools highest in Douala, and the
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probability of going to religious schools higher elsewhere. Children in
higher grades are more likely to be enrolled in private or religious
schools, as opposed to public schools. More often wealthier households
send their children to private and religious schools. The education of the
household head is not a key determinant of school choice, except when
the head has a university education, in which case the child is more
likely to go to a private or religious school. The sector of occupation of
the head does not have a statistically significant impact on the type of
school the child attends. 
We focus here on the results of the cost regressions (see table A11.1
in the annex). The regressors or correlates of the cost are (1) the type of
school attended by the child (this variable is instrumented as explained
above to avoid endogeneity issues); (2) the grade in school the child is
attending (with the first grade of the cycle being the reference category);
(3) characteristics of the child—the age of the child and the age squared,
the sex of the child, whether the child lives with his or her biological
family; (4) the geographic location of the child according to urban or
rural status and the main areas in the country (with Douala as the refer-
ence category); (5) the quintile of per capita consumption of the house-
hold in which the child lives; (6) household demographic
variables—whether the household head is male or female; (7) the edu-
cation level of the household head; and (8) the socioeconomic group of
the household head. 
The key variable of interest is the impact on cost of the type of school
attended by the child. Without instruments, the premium for private and
religious schools over public schools is very high, with private schools
about three times as expensive as public schools and religious schools at
least twice as expensive. With instruments, the differences are much
smaller, but still large. Thus instrumenting the regressions reduced as
expected the differential in costs. Private schools cost about 47 percent
more than public schools, and the premium for religious schools is at
40 percent. Other key drivers of cost include the fact of studying in the
Anglophone system (increase in cost of 18 percent) or being located in
Douala or Yaoundé (with Yaoundé more expensive than Douala, and
Douala more expensive than the other areas). The higher the grade the
child is in, the higher the cost is, with an especially large increase in cost
in grade 6. Better-off households tend to spend more, as proxied by the
quintiles of per capita consumption. When the household head has
achieved secondary education or a higher level, the household also spends
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more for the child’s schooling. The occupation of the household head is
less of a factor. 
Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to provide a comparative assessment of
the cost of faith-based, private, and government schools in Cameroon.
Contrary to what has been observed in some other African countries such
as Sierra Leone, religious schools in Cameroon are less targeted toward
the poor than public schools. This is probably in part because they are
more expensive, and in turn the cost of religious schools may be related
to the fact that, although they benefit from public subsidies, these subsi-
dies are not as large as for public schools. 
Simple basic statistics suggest that in regard to the fees that must be
paid to the schools, faith-based schools are about four times more expen-
sive than public schools in urban areas and three times more expensive
in rural areas. Private schools are even more expensive. Regression results
without controls for the endogeneity of school choice suggest as well
very large differences in costs between public and faith-based and pri-
vate schools. Yet once controls for endogeneity of school choice are
introduced, the differences in costs, although still large, are reduced sub-
stantially. The results suggest that private schools cost 47 percent
more than public schools, and the premium for religious schools is at
40 percent. 
Our results could have implications for policy, but before discussing
any such implications, for example, in terms of the financing of faith-
based schools, substantial additional contextual work would need to
be done. These results are also interesting in the African context. It is
often argued that faith-based schools serve the poor better than pub-
lic schools. Although this may be true in some countries, it is not in
others such as Cameroon. Detailed country-level work is needed to
better document the role of faith-based schools in education systems
before making any generalization on the services they provide, be it in
regard to their performance or to their cost. 
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Table A11.1  Determinants of the Logarithm of Education Expenditure
Noninstrumented model Instrumented model
Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t
Private school* 1.8374 0.0239 *** 0.4680 0.0227 ***
Religious 
school* 1.3828 0.0198 *** 0.4011 0.0167 ***
Anglophone 
system (yes) 0.2362 0.0280 *** 0.1864 0.0380 ***
Rural (yes) –0.1339 0.0165 *** –0.0096 0.0238
Region
Douala
Yaoundé 0.2364 0.0376 *** 0.1423 0.0530 ***
Adamaoua –0.6369 0.0417 *** –0.7317 0.0682 ***
Centre –0.2120 0.0383 *** –0.4643 0.0589 ***
Est –0.5453 0.0404 *** –0.6616 0.0665 ***
Extrême-nord –0.7448 0.0370 *** –0.7157 0.0645 ***
Littoral –0.2329 0.0421 *** –0.4447 0.0680 ***
Nord –0.6469 0.0398 *** –0.6445 0.0681 ***
Nord-ouest –0.6487 0.0433 *** –0.8648 0.0678 ***
Ouest –0.4922 0.0346 *** –0.7385 0.0551 ***
Sud –0.4568 0.0413 *** –0.5538 0.0680 ***
Sud-ouest –0.3657 0.0440 *** –0.5894 0.0668 ***
Grade 
Grade 1
Grade 2 –0.0534 0.0212 ** –0.0415 0.0283
Grade 3 –0.0329 0.0216 0.0191 0.0290
Grade 4 –0.0051 0.0223 0.0317 0.0299
Grade 5 0.0522 0.0220 ** 0.1000 0.0299 ***
Grade 6 0.7755 0.0231 *** 0.8221 0.0313 ***
Quintile
Q1
Q2 0.1005 0.0218 *** 0.0529 0.0293 *
Q3 0.1269 0.0221 *** 0.0142 0.0298
Q4 0.1803 0.0238 *** 0.0053 0.0333
Q5 0.3776 0.0272 *** 0.1904 0.0395 ***
Female head 
hh (yes) 0.0299 0.0157 * 0.0245 0.0208
Education hh
No education
Primary 
incomplete 0.0571 0.0208 *** 0.0497 0.0277 *
Primary 
complete 0.0158 0.0232 –0.0363 0.0311
Annex: Regression Results
(continued)
Note
1. As noted in earlier chapters of this book, this strategy of identifying the out-
come regression through a leave-out mean PSU-level variable affecting the
choice of an individual was used, among others, by Ravallion and Wodon
(2000) in their work on schooling and child labor in Bangladesh and by
Wodon (2000) in work on the impact of low income energy policies on the
probability of electricity disconnection in France. 
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